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Over its brief history, the discipline of psychology has seen its fair share of crises (Farr, 1991). In the grand
scheme of academic scholarship, it has sandwiched itself between the natural and the social sciences. This
positioning, in itself, has fuelled fierce as well as productive debates concerning the discipline’s scope, its phe-
nomenology, epistemology, and methodology (see Toomela & Valsiner, 2010). The latest crisis to afflict the dis-
cipline is the infamous ‘replication crisis’, precipitated by the Reproducibility Project which claimed that it was
only able to find evidence for successful replication of published psychological findings in 47% of cases (i.e.
less than chance, or 50%).
No doubt, many expected a higher replication rate, betraying a long held but little researched assumption con-
cerning the immutability of psychological phenomena. To put it simply, many expect psychological findings to
replicate invariably across diverse sociocultural contexts in the same way that, for instance, medical diagnoses
do (see Sammut, Foster, Salvatore, & Andrisano-Ruggieri, 2016). If one is diagnosed with diabetes in the US,
one does not expect different insulin uptake upon migration to China. Similar expectations are levelled at psy-
chology, based chiefly upon the discipline’s claims to knowledge concerning psychopathology and personality.
Like medical research, psychological scholarship here serves to typify and characterize individuals in ways that
facilitate treatment of psychological symptoms, conditions, or disorders. Unlike medical research, however, psy-
chological functioning seems to be amenable to, if not contingent upon, sociocultural influences. For instance,
we are not entirely sure whether the human personality is primarily composed of the Big Five trait constellation
(Costa & McCrae, 1992), or whether it becomes Seven if one is socialised in China (Wang, Cui, & Zhou, 2005;
Zhou, Saucier, Gao, & Liu, 2009).
A recent commentary by Baucal, Gillespie, Krstić, & Zittoun (2019) argues that the discipline has, over the
years, entertained three basic assumptions concerning the universality of psychological phenomena and the
Europe's Journal of Psychology
ejop.psychopen.eu | 1841-0413
extent to which these demonstrate variable manifestation in diverse ecological contexts (Gigerenzer, 2000).
The results emerging from the Reproducibility Project have thrown into crisis research programmes resting on
assumptions of immutability. Conversely, they have provided support to research traditions that have assumed
otherwise. In this contribution, I propose that the challenge precipitated by the replication crisis may have its
silver lining, inasmuch as it requires the discipline to confront a skeleton in its closet – the issue of relative sta-
bility. In so doing, I query whether there might be something that psychologists might have missed along the
way. Specifically, I propose that psychological research might be converging on a range of phenomena that lie
at the heart of the dynamic stability that has long afflicted personality research (see Connelly, Ones, &
Chernyshenko, 2014), but that might help explain how humans with genetically-rooted dispositions are capable
of adapting to situated circumstances (Gigerenzer, 2000; Sammut, Foster, Salvatore, & Andrisano-Ruggieri,
2016.
The Problem of People Who Kill Themselves
and a Lot of Others With Them
‘Charlie Hebdo’, ‘9/11’, ‘the London bombings’ – these terms today need no contextualisation; they are remem-
bered as terrorist events by virtue of their virality. The issue of individual differences in the endorsement of mili-
tant extremist beliefs has been, for some time now, a matter of intensive scientific research (Sageman, 2004).
The overarching aspiration in this line of inquiry is to understand the root cause of extremist violence. A promis-
ing line of inquiry is the investigation of the extremist mindset. Međedović & Knežević (2019) claim psychopa-
thology inspired research amongst militants and terrorists has yielded mixed empirical results. The issue has
been noted since Arendt’s (1963) landmark analysis of Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, convicted and executed
for war crimes perpetrated during his tenure as a Nazi officer. According to Arendt, Eichmann was no deranged
psychopath, but “terribly and terrifyingly normal” (p. 276).
Međedović & Knežević (2019) investigated the role played by certain personality traits in an effort to identify a
constellation marking the militant extremist personality (p. 92). The trait constellation in question is Disintegra-
tion, defined as “a proneness to see and feel connections among factually unrelated phenomena” (p. 93). This
is investigated in light of the Dark Tetrad of human personality (Paulhus, 2014). The study is moot on the point
as to whether this proneness is an individual psychological vulnerability associated with personality structures
of a certain type, or whether this is an ideological vulnerability associated with ideologies of a certain type. That
is, is extremism a function of the personality structure of the individual, or a function of the radical component in
organized beliefs?
The authors report that the Militant Extremist Mindset [MEM] is predicted by a subtle balance of dispositions (p.
101), although sadism is demonstrated to be unrelated to psychopathy, which contradicts previous findings.
The crucial issue, however, is whether MEM transpires similarly in clinical populations as subclinical ones, that
is whether individual differences transpire in degree or in type. If the difference is in degree, then it is fair to
investigate clinical traits in subclinical populations focusing on trait-like manifestations, as per the cited inquiry.
But if the difference is in type, then the findings concerning one population do not generalise to the other and
the expectation of replicating findings across this contextual diversity is misguided. Crucially, in the present
case, the authors proffer a situational explanation for militant extremism that is neither construed in terms of a
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characteristic trait constellation marking the extremist personality type, nor in substantive ideological terms typi-
fying certain beliefs as radical or extremist. Međedović & Knežević (2019) go on to claim that “In a context
where everyone is using others for their own purposes, it becomes justifiable to employ the same strategies in
order to change the state of affairs” (p. 100). In other words, in certain situations militant terrorism, terrifying as
it may be, is justifiably normal.
This construal, however, strikes at the heart of personality research based on the individual differences tradition
that also aspires to characterise types. If the predictive value of personality dispositions is contingent on their
activation in specific situations, then their predictive validity, along with the expectation of replicability, is neces-
sarily limited due to situational contingencies that are in themselves wholly unpredictable. To take stock, per-
sonality research has, broadly speaking, discerned trait-like structures that are seemingly associated with de-
termined inclinations. The fruition of these inclinations in behaviour, however, is contingent on situational cir-
cumstances that are in themselves, open-ended. That is, if the stability of personality structures is only discerni-
ble in the specific situation, that is, if stability is relative – not to cultural context, but to situational context – then
the burden facing personality researchers to map the precise structure of situational influences acting on the
agent at the particular moment in which the structure has evinced becomes, truly, an untenable task. Along with
the expectation of trans-situational replicability. Clearly, it is time for the discipline to acknowledge that univer-
salistic aspirations regarding human cognition and personality have not been supported and rather than fixing
statistics with more statistics (Baucal, Gillespie, Krstić, & Zittoun, 2019), it is time for the discipline to consider
more deeply the range of phenomena that enable human adaptation to situational contingencies, given some
stability in both personality dispositions and sociocultural contexts.
Situated Cognition
A critical concern that has underlined numerous other debates in psychology is whether knowledge of psycho-
logical structures and processes serves descriptive or predictive purposes. For instance, does knowledge of the
existence of racial stereotypes in a population serve to (aside from describing the state of the distribution of
racial stereotypes in the specific population at the specific point in time it is investigated) predict correlated out-
comes, such as frequency of hate crimes, on the basis of knowledge of the relations between racial stereotypes
and hate crimes observed in other instances? The extension from descriptive research to inferential research
aspiring to describe underlying and invariant processes has been long challenged theoretically (Harré &
Secord, 1972) and, if the findings of the Reproducibility Project are anything to go by, now also empirically
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015).
A situated view of personality and cognition counterbalances both foci. As Smith & Semin (2007) have argued,
the situated view proposes that any description of human behaviour is only meaningful if it serves to establish
grounds for communicative mutuality. This is due to the fact that human cognition is motivated (Kunda, 1990)
and predisposed towards sociality (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Human cognition enables
individuals to form social identities around collective interests (Sammut, 2012). This form of sociality is only rel-
atively enduring – as individuals’ interests change, the composition of the social group ebbs and flows, resulting
in situational influences on group members. The situated view opposes the idea that inclinations flow invariably
from autonomous, invariant cognitive processes located within independent agents. It proposes instead that
motivated functions determine the nature of these processes.
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For instance, an agent’s emotional state influences behavioural outcomes in the situation aside from sociocul-
tural features of the society in which the behaviour occurs, or the personality dispositions of the agent involved.
The situated emotional state of the agent is unstable in ways that go beyond general psychological orientations
(such as personality structure) and are contingent on the unpredictable. For instance, need for closure research
has demonstrated that time pressure (e.g. running late) leads to cognitive shortcuts in decision-making
(Kruglanski, 2004). This suggests that if certain behavioural responses do not serve a motivated function, the
cognitive processes leading to them will not be activated (Smith & Semin, 2007, p. 133). Consequently, this in-
vites researchers to specify not only the psychological processes observed in themselves, but more important-
ly, the boundaries limiting their activation. The variable potential that inheres in personality structures, making
stability in behavioural influences as a function of trait dispositions merely relative, provides plenty of scope for
inquiry in its own right. I propose this might be key to understanding, more deeply, the human potential for sit-
uational adaptation.
The Explanation of Social Behaviour
Psychological researchers investigating stable dispositional orientations in human personality have reliably ob-
served, over the years, that personality structures are inherently unstable across variable circumstances. Spe-
cifically, it seems that the factor concerned with ‘Openness to Experience’ might have something to do with re-
configurations in the personality structure (Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014). I argue that such reconfi-
gurations are adaptive and contingent on the individual’s situated circumstances. I propose that personality
structure resembles a psychological camouflage by which dispositional inclinations are reconfigured (i.e. the
personality structure is re-structured) to match situated ecological demands.
As noted, personality researchers looking for stable structures have routinely observed instability in personality
dynamics. Conversely, researchers investigating social-psychological dynamics have routinely observed stable
structures. By analogy to the Rubin Vase, those looking for a chalice have observed human faces whilst those
searching for human faces have observed a chalice. Rather than an empirical inconsistency, I argue that this is
a case of convergence in disparate research traditions.
The Big Five model of human personality comprised of a five-factor personality structure is very well-known
(Costa & McCrae, 1992). The premise underlying this personality model is that human behaviour is genetically-
based, at least in part, through inherent dispositions that develop in individuals over the course of maturation.
By the time they reach adulthood, human beings develop an idiosyncratic personality, rooted in a constellation
of traits shaped by genetic influences, that predisposes them to characteristic behavioural responses. What this
model falls short in explaining is how and why these trait-based dispositions may change in the same individual
over time, or why behavioural responses shaped by the same trait dispositions are inconsistent across situa-
tions for the same individuals. An equally well-known model that is similarly based on factor analytic techniques
is the Cultural Dimensions model (Hofstede, 1991). The premise underlying this sociological model is that hu-
man behaviour is a function of cultural values transmitted through socialisation. Different cultures prioritise dif-
ferent values, depending on which cultural dimensions are salient in different societies, that lead to individuals
expressing this cross-cultural variability in behavioural outcomes. What this model falls short in explaining is
how and why some individuals demonstrate similar behavioural dispositions across different cultures, or how
within a given culture individual differences may be highly marked. These two models are amongst similar ef-
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forts that have aimed to map out psychological and sociological structures in an effort to account for behaviou-
ral diversity. Both programmes, however, are prone to relative influences that lead to observed structural
changes over time, situations, people, and contexts.
On the other hand, three other research programmes have investigated belief dymanics. The symbolic univer-
ses programme has investigated dynamics of sense-making in Europe in response to the financial and immi-
gration crises. The social axioms programme sought to investigate cross-cultural differences in core beliefs that
can account for behavioural diversity within and across cultures. The moral frameworks programme has studied
the fundamental moral choices individuals make when they opt for a particular behavioural response that is jus-
tified in a given context against similarly justifiable alternative responses that lie at the individual’s disposal. All
three programmes have claimed that behaviour is responsive to contextual characteristics that may precipitate
changes in the current order. All three have also reported five loosely stable structures that seem to play a role
in how individuals respond to other people and the events happening around them.
Symbolic Universes
Salvatore et al. (2018) propose that human cognition is organised around embodied and affect-laden general-
ized worldviews that determine the construal of situations by different individuals. In other words, the same
stimulus may be construed as an opportunity by some, or an obstacle by another – depending on the general-
ized worldview the individual has privately subscribed to and regardless of their own private personality-based
inclinations. According to the authors, these universes foster social engagement due to perspectival solidarity
achieved between agents. In their Europe-wide study concerning the effects of the economic and migration cri-
ses in Europe, the authors report the presence of 5 universes. The Ordered universe represents adherence to
systems-based rules and regulations. The Interpersonal Bond universe represents valorization of social capital.
The Caring Society universe is marked by a striving for community. Niche of Belongingness represents the ef-
fort to find a legitimate place in life for oneself and one’s loved ones. The Others’ World universe represents an
attitude of helplessness and grit in the face of adversity.
Social Axioms
Leung and Bond (2010) propose that human cognition is structured around generalized beliefs individuals hold
about other people, social groups, institutions, society, and the spiritual realm. These general beliefs grant co-
herence in thinking about disparate elements in the world around us. Consequently, they are endorsed in an
axiomatic fashion and serve to guide everyday conduct that involves the mutual presence of others. The au-
thors distinguish between 5 social axioms, which they claim are universal in existence but variable in their man-
ifestation: (a) Religiosity, representing an unquestioning attitude towards prescribed dogma; (b) Social Com-
plexity, representing an attitude of strategic contingency based on interpersonal situations; (c) Reward for Ap-
plication, representing a generalised attitude of striving for the betterment of one’s condition; (d) Fate Control,
representing a generalised belief in the necessity to find a place for oneself in a powerful and controlled social
order; and (e) Social Cynicism, representing a generalised belief that there is little one can do about the preva-
lent order to ameliorate one’s condition.
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Moral Foundations
Haidt (2012) claims that human beings are equipped with intuitive ethics that originate in their evolutionary sur-
vival. According to Haidt, these moral foundations provide us with flashes of affect in specific situations that
serve to guide our conduct and shape our interpretation of the situation. Different cultures use these moral
foundations differently to censure or otherwise particular action strategies. In the process of socialisation, indi-
viduals learn the normative rules that prevail around them. Violation of these rules triggers affective responses
that predispose individuals towards determined responses. Haidt (2012) distinguished between 5 moral frame-
works, that is (a) Sanctity, concerned with violations of degradation; (b) Loyalty, concerned with violation of trust
and betrayal; (c) Care, concerned with violations resulting in harm; (d) Fairness, concerned with possibilities for
cheating; and (e) Authority, concerned with subversion of a prevalent order. Haidt further proposes that addi-
tional frameworks may develop as a function of particular sociocultural concerns, such as the framework of
Liberty in the US.
The Psychological Gearbox: Mentalities, or is it Mindsets?
Clearly, a full theoretical rapprochement of these disparate research traditions is beyond the scope of the
present contribution. However, the similarities reported in the descriptions of the underlying factors are palpable
(see Table 1) and warrant consideration of the possibility of converging evidence.
Table 1
Five Factor Outputs in Generalized Beliefs Research Traditions
Symbolic Universes Social Axioms Moral Foundations
Ordered Religiosity Sanctity
Interpersonal Bond Social Complexity Loyalty
Caring Society Reward for Application Care
Niche of Belongingness Fate Control Fairness
Others’ World Social Cynicism Authority
All three research programmes have extended psychological inquiry beyond personality-based dispositions to
generalized mental frames that mark individuals’ situated positioning relative to others on matters of social con-
cern. The central idea investigated in these programmes is whether there are individual differences in how hu-
man beings interpret the events that happen to them and the world around them, controlling for personality
structure. For instance, we can readily understand cultural differences in preferences for individual behavioural
responses. These represent social norms of conduct. We can also readily understand how, within the same cul-
ture, different personality structures demonstrated by different individuals may precipitate different behavioural
responses to the same stimulus. What we struggle to understand as readily is how the same individual, within
the same culture, behaves in one way in one situation and a different way in another situation, when facing the
same stimulus. We struggle with this because we expect the phenotype to match the genotype. Unless, that is,
one considers a range of phenomena amenable to situational influences that also determine behaviour in part. I
propose that mentalities are one such variable and that the three programmes considered above have tapped
this very construct and similarly reported the same five-factor structure.
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The notion of mentalities has been proposed by Burke (1986) to delineate a stress on collective attitudes that
serve the purposes of practical reasoning and that are structured in terms of how people think as well as what
they think. That is, mentalities represent substantive cognition. Etymologically, mentality refers to a ‘thinking
style’. A related construct that arguably constitutes the other ground in this Rubin Vase is ‘mindset’, which ety-
mologically represents a ‘thinking habit’. We have seen how mindsets extend the search for behavioural dispo-
sitions beyond the Big Five, as in the search for a Militant Extremist Mindset [MEM] cited above. I propose that
mindsets are akin to specific mentalities and that this range of mentalities in human psychology constitutes the
social-psychological mechanism by which individuals with pre-determined inclinations adapt their responses to
ecological demands. To use a metaphor, mentalities are like a 5-piece psychological Swiss Army knife that ena-
bles individuals to psychologically adapt their mindset to tangibly situated environmental demands. If individual
psychological adaptation to situational demands was not a successful strategy, then we would be justified in
expecting personality structures to be much more enduring – you would have a knife for a knife job and a fork
for a fork job. This is not how human behaviour manifests. To pose an example, G.I. Joe can go from being a
foot soldier concerned with obliterating the enemy to a networking strategist coordinating logistics upon receiv-
ing a promotion. An adaptation in mindset might be called for, as one cannot adopt a combative stance in logis-
tics. Many human beings routinely adapt to similar circumstances without issue. On the other hand, G. I. Joe
may adapt by joining a security business at the end of his duty, where the same combative mindset may pay off
in a novel environment. What this simple example makes clear is that neither personality structure nor sociocul-
tural dimensions are very useful in understanding how an individual actuates their behavioural inclinations in
situated circumstances.
Conclusion
The replication crisis has precipitated renewed concerns about the nature of psychological phenomena and
their manifestation in ecologically diverse contexts. Clearly, universalistic expectations concerning the manifes-
tation of psychological phenomena are not supported. I have proposed that human psychology may demon-
strate phenotype switching, which enables individuals to camouflage their inclinations for adaptation to situated
ecological demands. This occurs by adopting a best-fitting mindset out of a range of mentalities that inhere in
human psychology. I have argued that research looking at social dynamics suggests that human cognition is
structured along five mentalities. I have then argued that this range of mentalities equips individuals with a mul-
tipurpose psychological mechanism to suit different ecological demands, like a Swiss Army knife provides a
range of instruments to cater to different requirements.
Mentalities, therefore, provide human beings with the capacity for environmental calibration. Further research is
required to determine what factors precipitate changes in mentality. Presumably, a mentality that is no longer
functional due to situational constraints leads to maladaptive behaviour. This should precipitate psychological
discomfort, or cognitive dissonance, that is reduced by revisiting the individual’s construal of the event, as per
Festinger’s (1957) original findings. Phenotype switching of mentalities, therefore, enables individuals to adapt
to changing circumstances.
I propose that mentalities work like a psychological gearbox for individuals to cope with their particular life ter-
rain. The individual’s personality dispositions, partly rooted in genetics, are like a vehicle. Some vehicles are
better than others, given particular environmental demands. A sports car may be a sight to behold at the race-
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track, but in off-road conditions it will likely turn out to be a maladaptive choice. This is individual differences.
But human beings demonstrate a capacity for adaptation in the same way that different cars can be driven in
ways that accommodate ecological requirements – that is, environmental calibration. If driving a sports car off-
road, one is advised to select a lower gear that permits the driver to ride slowly over bumps. If driving an off-
road vehicle at the racetrack, one is advised to select a higher gear for the vehicle to increase and maintain
velocity. Mentalities, therefore, are like gears – a range of five that enable the particular agent to calibrate their
dispositional inclinations to ecological demands. Sometimes, it pays an individual to be open, positive, or inno-
vative. This might be due to the fact that the individual finds themselves in a stable environment that provides
for the individual’s needs. An open and positive mindset enables the individual to explore and reap opportuni-
ties for growth. At other times, it pays an individual to adopt a more cautious demeanour, to consider risk and
worst-case scenarios. These help the individual overcome challenges and strife in times of adversity. Necessa-
rily, for the behavioural response to be adaptive, the behavioural strategy needs to match the situated ecologi-
cal demands. A growth mindset when facing bankruptcy is as maladaptive as a helpless mindset when opportu-
nity beckons. Individuals, I argue, calibrate their behavioural strategies to environmental demands by adapting
their psychological mindset to the situation, such that uncharacteristically cautious behaviour, for example,
might start making sense to the bullish investor. Equally, uncharacteristically positive behaviour might start
making sense to the re-settled refugee whose suspicious inclinations paid off in the past when facing a high-
risk environment.
Clearly, adaptation in the human species is psychologically, not biologically, based – human beings do not dem-
onstrate biological camouflage. Rather, in the human species, this involves an ability to change one’s mindset
to a more profitable one. The capacity to switch mindsets is observable as situated cognition on the one hand,
or relative stability on the other. Further research is required to determine the criteria that precipitate change; to
determine whether the range of 5 mentalities is true to every individual or whether, like language, this might be
a question of inherent potential contingent on socialisation; to determine whether psychological intervention
may help individuals precipitate mentality changes; and to determine which mentalities might be indicated in
specific circumstances. In any case, a focus on mentalities may provide answers concerning the potential for
human adaptation. Changing one’s mentality or mindset involves the re-construal of particular events that
opens up a profitable and cognitively consistent course of action – was this a good thing or a bad thing? Who
gains, who loses? Should we act, or stay put? I conclude by suggesting that the study of psychological adapta-
tion mechanisms may be key to understanding a host of dynamic behaviours such as creativity, decision-mak-
ing, empathy, communication styles, resilience, and other behavioural strategies humans adopt to face the situ-
ated challenges they encounter over their lifetime.
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